In a riveting interview with ACE’s editor-in-chief Kateřina Urbanová, Senator Pavel Fischer sounds the alarm on the critical security threats posed by Chinese technologies infiltrating our daily lives. From espionage capabilities hidden in electric vehicles to smart appliances that could compromise our privacy, Fischer reveals how deeply these risks penetrate our society. He challenges us with a provocative question: Are we unwittingly inviting surveillance into our homes? Fischer calls for decisive legislative action and a united global response to safeguard our democratic values and national security. Read on to uncover why he believes the stakes have never been higher.
Q: Senator Fischer, you have raised concerns about the security risks posed by Chinese technologies, particularly regarding their potential use for espionage. Could you elaborate on the specific threats these technologies, such as electric vehicles with espionage-capable chips, pose and how they could be used to gather sensitive data or disrupt critical infrastructure?
Fischer: Before we talk about technology, artificial intelligence, and quantum computers, let us talk for a moment about a strategic issue. China has stood up to Russia. And Russia is today in flagrant violation of the UN Charter with its military campaign against Ukraine. It is threatening the security of the whole of Europe. If China has become an accomplice in this war of aggression, we should draw conclusions.
When the Chinese regime confined itself to its own problems of extreme poverty and used ink and paper, it was a different story from today. This centralist regime now uses the most advanced technology to control hundreds of millions of people at home and to exert its influence abroad. Today, it exports that technology to us, giving it access to sensitive data it collects in violation of our laws. While the boundaries of China’s influence used to be along its land borders, even there it is not without violence—I am reminded only of the fierce clashes between the Chinese navy operating in the territorial waters of the Philippines, or the bloody clashes that China organizes on the border with India. In these clashes, the PRC has long ceased to be a peaceful power, a sleepy and clumsy panda. China has changed. The sooner we understand this, the better off we will be.
We know from talking to our allies how tough China is on Australia, on New Zealand, on Japan, on the Americas and on Africa. This is China’s global campaign against democracy and freedom.
And that is why the all-important Borders of Influence is taking place today, right in our own kitchens. With every smart appliance, we put ourselves at risk of being monitored by a regime that does not wish us well.
Q: What steps can be taken at the legislative level to mitigate these risks, and how can we ensure that our critical infrastructure is protected from such vulnerabilities?
Fischer: Laws alone are not the answer: they can only be general and can only be changed from time to time. Today, however, technology is moving so fast that we would have to rewrite laws all the time. So we need to do things differently. In three ways.
First, we must strengthen our resilience. That means strengthening our security institutions. But government can’t do everything. It is important to inform citizens that there are serious security threats and risks behind the cheap solutions from China. It may therefore be more cost-effective to wait for a safer solution.
Secondly, we need to build alliances and cooperation with those states that respect human freedoms, the rule of law and parliamentary democracy, and where today’s situation is seen as a serious threat.
Finally, and very practically, the state must pay attention to critical infrastructure. The authority of the state must be strengthened, because it is the state that is responsible for the security of its citizens. And without security, there can be no prosperity. In this area, we and the EU Member States have so far done woefully little and very late. We have seen this in the example of our heavy dependence on energy supplies from Russia. This dependence has become almost fatal for us. Europe has reached an impasse and, in the midst of the energy crisis, has had to look for costly solutions to break this dependence. A similar situation exists today with China.
Q: Former MI6 chief Sir Richard Dearlove has warned that Chinese-made technologies, including electric vehicles, could be remotely controlled, potentially bringing essential services to a standstill and stealing users’ data. How do you assess the likelihood of such scenarios, and what measures should the Czech Republic implement to prevent them?
Fischer: Yes, that’s exactly right. We recently discussed the Cyber Defence Bill in this country. It would have given the state greater powers to detect an imminent attack on our country in cyberspace at an early stage. Cyberspace has now become a regular theatre for our armed forces—we used to have ground forces, air forces, and now we have cyber units and units to defend against attacks in space. And in our political debate there has been strong resistance to the state ‘controlling’ anything. It was even discussed whether the law could even talk about ‘sensors’ that would anonymously monitor Internet traffic and, in the event of network congestion, allow state institutions to analyze the matter and prepare countermeasures.
But it was very difficult to get the words ‘monitoring’, ‘sensors’ or ‘probes’ into the law. Today, however, we know that the electric car is not only equipped with cameras, but that it also collects data on its surroundings, on temperature or humidity, and that it also picks up wireless connections and establishes connections via gateways to the mobile network. I find this paradoxical.
If the professional public sounded the alarm when the armed forces of the country, a state governed by the rule of law where government officials can be held accountable in parliament, sounded the alarm, then it is high time to open a debate on whether Chinese products equipped with smart technology, such as electric cars, are a smart weapon of the totalitarian regime from China against us.
For example, if 30% of road traffic in Europe were to be made up of cars from China, there is nothing easier than to remotely trigger mass accidents and cripple our continent economically, politically and in terms of security. And that is a threat that we have a duty to warn people about before they buy these products. Finally, we should not overlook the fact that they have produced so many of them in China that they will now try to undercut them on world markets. And Europe is offering itself as a market. It is high time we stopped this.
Q: The potential threat posed by various Chinese technologies has been compared to the Huawei 5G controversy. In your view, how do these issues compare in terms of national security risks, and what lessons can be learned from the Huawei case that can be applied to the regulation of other Chinese technologies?
Fischer: I think the lesson from Huawei is simple. The security community knew about the technological threat of the company’s products sometime in 2010. It was only in 2014 that our counterintelligence agencies warned in their annual report that ZTE and Huawei products could pose a security risk. In 2018, the government, in collaboration with our national cybersecurity agency, prepared a decision warning of the risks of using these companies’ technology to build 5G networks. In 2022, the country’s state authorities issued a new recommendation that only technology from secure countries should be used to build critical infrastructure. But it wasn’t until 2023 that our largest telecoms operators started to follow these recommendations, when their bosses publicly announced after a meeting with the Prime Minister that they would respect them. So where does that leave us? We have shown ourselves to be very slow to respond to a real threat. Operators may still be demanding that the new Cyber Security Act spells out all the details, but that is a trap. Because technology is evolving so rapidly, the law simply cannot reflect these developments in detail. In this respect, I am convinced that operators should not be so slow. Instead, they would do a better job of anticipating security concerns. Their customers would appreciate it.
Q: How should international cooperation be structured to address these common security threats effectively?
Fischer: Yes, absolutely, international cooperation is the key. Here I must praise the initiatives of the Czech Republic, which has begun to organize an international conference of like-minded states to reflect together, with full respect for the rule of law and fundamental human freedoms, on the challenges posed by new technologies and on how to counter the influx of cheap production from China and other places where they are not interested in what we have in our constitution, but where, respecting the directives of the Communist Party, they are trying to assert technological dominance over us. These conferences have been taking place in Prague without interruption since 2019, and not even the COVID pandemic has stopped them. This Prague initiative has been very instrumental and fruitful, as the subsequent debate at EU level (with the adoption of the EU 5G Toolbox) or among NATO member states (with the focus on supply chain security) has underlined how complex this agenda can be.
Q: Balancing economic interests with national security is a recurring theme when discussing foreign technology. How can the Czech Republic navigate this balance, particularly with Chinese technologies, without stifling technological and economic growth?
Fischer: I’m convinced that the dilemma you raise is not accurately described. Because only if the technological solutions are compatible with our Constitution, with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, and with other texts that we hold dear, only then can we talk about whether something is compatible with our security interests. If the proposed solution does not respect privacy, if the developers do not care about what we have in the Constitution, and if they are working for a regime that is imperialistic and destabilizing the whole region, then we have to be careful.
Just analyze what China itself is communicating. Their statements are very clear. Everyone is obliged to cooperate with the secret services and the authorities, including the programmer of an application that we are going to use here.
Listening to our partners, I am not surprised how China behaves on the border with India. Or how it violates the rules of international law at sea in Philippine territorial waters. Or how it threatens Malaysia by claiming territory it has no right to. And when Beijing threatens to use force against Taiwan, that is, in my view, a flagrant violation of the UN Charter.
Q: What role do you see for the European Union in creating a unified approach to this issue?
Fischer: I am convinced that the European Union has been so fixated on the free market that it has forgotten about security. We have been so religious about prosperity that we have overlooked something important. Namely, that without security there is no prosperity. I think the EU should be much more ambitious when it comes to its relations with China. It is fine to give to China, but to stand firm. This applies not only to goods or investment coming from China, but also to our companies doing business with China. I find it scandalous that the safety products of European companies come from the slave labour of those who have been locked up in Chinese labour camps for re-education. It reminds me of the darkest chapters in the development of the 20th century. So the first thing to do is to ban products made with slave labour. Let us stop looking the other way: in China today there are slaves, political prisoners being sentenced to death for organ transplants. The transplant business is so grossly there, with the help of customers from Europe. I think it is high time to inform the public about the dangerous regime we are dealing with.
Q: How can consumers be educated about these risks, and what should they look for when purchasing devices and vehicles incorporating foreign technology?
Fischer: Awareness costs money. Let me give you an example. A Czech technology company offered services and ready-made solutions, even using products from China. But its owners decided to break away from their dependence on China for security reasons. They had to change not only software, but also chips, entire boards and components, and much more. It took a lot of effort and investment. But in the end, the company was able to break free again and attain a competitive advantage. This soon became apparent in the US market, where customers—not only private, but also governmental—began to put a lot of emphasis on security and the threat of a link to China. As a result, the company began to see a significant improvement in both its bottom line and record profits. In America, the rule is that if you are found to be using Chinese technology in a bakery or restaurant, but you try to bid on public contracts at street fairs or in Congress or City Hall, you are out of luck. Only those who can prove that they are not in any way connected to China can hope to do business in the US. And that applies to both private and public institutions. But in this country, we have to look at the whole supply chain. And here we have a long way to go as the Czech Republic and also NATO countries. But we have to start informing our citizens in a responsible way. Otherwise they could rightly complain that the state has not informed them.
Q: Given the global nature of the technology industry, how should the Czech Republic collaborate with international partners to address the security risks posed by Chinese technologies?
Fischer: This is a defence issue—first and foremost. It is not a concern of NATO, after all, NATO’s own conclusions already make it clear that the PRC is a threat to our security. Then much more needs to be done in the EU. And beyond that, for example, in international cooperation with like-minded states, as I mentioned earlier. The Cyber Conference has been taking place in Prague for several years now and has achieved many important steps based on a common will. But I am convinced that much more needs to be done.
Q: How significant is the threat of Chinese technology being used within national government operations? What precautions should be taken to safeguard against such vulnerabilities in sensitive sectors?
Fischer: It would be a big mistake to put Chinese technology into waste disposal systems, waste processing systems, or transport systems. If it is already a threat, for example, to use components that act as gateways for 4G networks and information systems. These boards are now being installed in refrigerators, washing machines, and all the little toys we use every day. It could easily happen that cars with these toxic components will not be allowed to cross NATO military bases in the future. This is a huge issue for the US group, for example—the Czech Republic, where we are producing excellent Škoda cars—is very uncomfortable with these questions. Firstly, because it has had a lot of success in the US.
Q: TikTok has been accused of illegal data collection and potential spying on users. What steps should Czech citizens and military personnel take to protect themselves from these risks?
Fischer: TikTok addiction is now well known. Algorithms are so sophisticated that we now see how young users’ growth is growing. But I don’t want Beijing collecting data on my children, and I don’t want the Communists in China collecting compromising information on the generation that will be in charge of our country. Imagine if one day a ministerial candidate comes along who accesses content from China via an app like TikTok? Isn’t that a very serious threat, not only to the healthy development of our children, but to society as a whole? If TikTok, according to university analysis, has the ability to hide unpleasant information and to censor, then I think it is important that we talk about it, also in terms of who has access to our children. Because election campaigns are now being conducted via social media, including TikTok. And I don’t think it’s a coincidence that in our country today we are remotely controlled from abroad by communities in China.
Q: If the Czech Republic restricts or bans Chinese technology, what forms of retaliation can we expect from China (e.g., cyberattacks, sanctions, trade bans)?
Fischer: I’m not in the habit of telling the Chinese what to do. I am not telling them to leave their Communist Party, but we will have to keep reminding them of the red lines they tell us to respect. Our ambition is to get to a point where we draw the red lines and demand that they respect them.
Interviewed and edited: Katerina Urbanova
Photo credit: Pavel Fischer
