Resilience, Integration and Neutrality:
How Switzerland Is Positioning Its Air Force for a Changing Security Environment
“Neutrality Does Not Mean Isolation” – The Swiss Air Force Between Defence, Cooperation and Transformation
The international security order is under growing strain, and Europe is increasingly confronted with hybrid threats, cyberattacks and the return of military force as a tool of power politics.
For Switzerland, this development poses specific challenges: how to safeguard national sovereignty and neutrality while remaining interoperable and resilient in an interconnected security environment.
In this interview, Major General Christian Oppliger, Commander of the Swiss Air Force, explains how Switzerland is strengthening its air defence, rebuilding lost capabilities, integrating fifth-generation systems such as the F-35A, and redefining cooperation with neighbouring air forces – all while preserving freedom of political decision-making.
How has the security environment in Europe changed in recent years from your perspective – and what does that mean concretely for your country’s air forces?
Globally, the international order has weakened and relations between major powers have become increasingly tense.
States no longer negotiate exclusively on the basis of law, but increasingly enforce their interests through hard means – including the use of force.
Looking at Europe, it is evident that deliberate attempts are being made to destabilise European states through cyberattacks, disinformation and other instruments.
Democratic societies are intentionally unsettled and polarised.
These threats originate both externally and internally: from terrorist groups or radicalised individuals, as well as from states or state-affiliated actors.
Armed conflict is taking place on a daily basis – including in Europe.
In line with Switzerland’s security policy priorities, the Swiss Air Force is therefore required to further strengthen its resilience.
This includes, in particular, the early detection of dangers and the anticipation of threats, robust protection of critical infrastructure, and the self-protection of forces, including the decentralisation of assets.
Increasing the availability of systems and ammunition is also essential.
In addition, the Swiss Armed Forces as a whole must expand their defensive capabilities.
For the Air Force, this means regaining capabilities lost after the end of the Cold War – for example in air-to-ground operations – expanding existing capabilities such as integrated air defence to include missile defence, and enabling offensive effects against adversary air power potential.
Security challenges, rapid technological change and new operational requirements therefore demand continuous development of our capabilities, procedures and, ultimately, structures.
Interoperability – particularly with the air forces of neighbouring countries – is also a central focus of our efforts.
Routine operations, tensions and conflicts can no longer be understood as clearly separated phases, but rather as a continuous spectrum along which we must align our options for action and defence.
Which three modernisation priorities of your air force system up to 2030 would you name as the most important?
To regain our defensive capability, a rapid and substantial expansion of air defence is required.
To this end, we are, first, deepening military cooperation and consistently developing the existing concept of Integrated Air Defense (IAD) into Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD), which we are implementing step by step.
Second, the newly established Space Competence Centre of the Air Force will begin building the operational space domain from January 2026.
Using a graduated approach, key capabilities will be developed, including space situational awareness, Earth observation, telecommunications, precision navigation and appropriate countermeasures.
Third, targeted personnel development is of central importance.
Modern systems require highly qualified specialists and a capable militia.
Accordingly, increasing attractiveness, ensuring high-quality training and sustainably securing personnel resources are key priorities.
What role does regional cooperation in the DACH region play for you personally – and where do you see the greatest added value of this cooperation?
Security reality makes closer cooperation indispensable.
Threats operate across borders, and airspace security can only be ensured jointly today.
In the air domain, a purely national and autonomous security strategy is neither effective nor responsible and would entail significant risks.
Against this background, Switzerland does not need to be part of a military alliance, but it must be part of a functioning European security architecture.
Swiss neutrality does not preclude cooperation; rather, it guarantees independence in national decision-making.
Neutrality therefore does not mean security isolation, but freedom of action combined with cooperation.
Accordingly, Switzerland has maintained bilateral agreements with its immediate neighbours for many years to conduct cross-border air policing.
These cooperations are an expression of a responsible and realistic security policy.
In the future, the exclusive focus on air policing should be expanded into an integrated approach addressing threats from the air that already exist in everyday operations.
“Neutrality does not mean security isolation, but freedom of action combined with cooperation.”
How do you manage the challenge of balancing cutting-edge technology, limited resources and personnel requirements at the same time?
By setting clear priorities – which is easier said than done.
Our employees and service members are our most valuable asset, and we take targeted care of them accordingly.
Modern systems only achieve their full effect if professional personnel and militia members are excellently trained, motivated and ready for deployment.
It is therefore essential to increase attractiveness, strengthen competitiveness in the labour market, design training efficiently and at a high level of quality, and promote people in a targeted manner.
This is a key prerequisite for our long-term ability to act and operate.
The current need for high levels of investment must be planned sustainably by including operating costs in budget considerations from the outset and by ensuring that the architecture of procured systems offers high development potential.
This allows regular capability upgrades at reasonable cost and enables the use of automation to make training and personnel deployment more efficient.
How does the next generation of threats – drones, long-range weapons, the cyber dimension – change the thinking and training of your air forces?
The next generation of threats – from drones to long-range and precision weapons and the cyber domain – fundamentally changes the thinking and training of air forces.
Threats today are networked, fast and often operate below traditional escalation thresholds, which means that air defence must be understood as an integrated, multi-domain-capable system.
Accordingly, training is becoming more interoperable, more digital and more modular, including through increased use of simulators.
The focus is on connectivity, reaction speed, decision-making ability and endurance.
The latter requires that more personnel can be recruited and trained faster.
In addition to technical system knowledge, systemic thinking, cyber understanding and cross-domain cooperation are central.
The aim is to train both the professional organisation and the militia in such a way that they remain adaptive, resilient and capable of action even in a dynamic and hybrid threat environment.
You played a key role in the introduction of the F-35A. What organisational or cultural changes does a fifth-generation system bring to the Swiss Air Force?
At the end of the 1990s, with the introduction of the F/A-18, the Swiss Air Force relinquished offensive air-to-ground capabilities, although the aircraft was well suited for such missions.
Air reconnaissance was also largely shifted to drones and no longer pursued from fighter aircraft.
With the procurement of the F-35A, these lost capabilities are being rebuilt, which already requires extensive reorganisation of the Air Force.
Structures and command capabilities were adjusted as of 1 January 2026.
In parallel with the introduction of the fighter aircraft, ground-based air defence systems of various ranges and semi-mobile ground-based sensors for air picture generation, capabilities for operational planning and situational awareness are being developed, particularly with regard to the initial operational capability of the various weapon systems.
The Air Operations Center will be particularly affected.
Special consideration is being given to the unique capabilities and operational doctrine of a fifth-generation fighter aircraft.
Its employment in a highly networked environment as well as in a “discreet” mode as a closed sensor-information-command-effect cycle, and its ability to enable multi-domain operations, pose particular challenges for the C2 structures of the Swiss Air Force and their integration into a Joint Operations Command.
Logistics processes and the Global Support Solution must also be adapted to the international, cooperative support and logistics concept for the F-35.
This, in turn, has implications for the industrial ecosystem related to the operation and maintenance of combat aircraft in Switzerland.
Switzerland is neutral but works closely with European partners technically and operationally. How do you define this balance in 2025?
Neutrality does not preclude cooperation.
Exchange with other air forces is indispensable and directly strengthens the defensive capability of the Swiss Armed Forces.
Training our crews with other nations provides experience that would not be possible in this form in Switzerland.
Interoperability is also essential – and building it takes years.
That is why we adopt standards, procure standardised systems and, where appropriate, adapt our processes and structures.
Which aspects of F-35 integration are particularly demanding for you – personnel, infrastructure, cyber/IT or interoperability?
With the F-35A, interoperability is less a challenge than an opportunity.
Infrastructure is a key enabler for the reliable operation of the F-35A, and in this area Switzerland has benefited from the experiences shared by numerous partner nations.
A major challenge lies in understanding and implementing the interfaces and interactions between the F-35, the cyber domain as an independent operational domain, and IT as a cross-cutting function and enabler within the Swiss Armed Forces.
The task is to enable the procurement, provision and distribution of data and products for joint operations while complying with specific requirements in the F-35 environment.
The qualification of personnel to operate and employ the F-35 efficiently – at all levels and across all areas, including the training of conscripts to increase endurance – will be particularly demanding.
Here, too, we highly appreciate the willingness of the F-35 user community to share knowledge, for example by allowing Switzerland to participate as an observer in joint exercises and simulator environments.
Subsequent participation in larger multinational exercises will further help us adapt and refine tactics, techniques and procedures to Switzerland’s specific context.
What would you like to shape or advance concretely in the first 24 months of your term as Commander of the Air Force?
The Swiss Air Force is undergoing a phase of profound transformation.
In the coming months, my central task is to guide the Air Force in an orderly and measured manner into a new era.
My focus is on bundling all efforts to establish a solid foundation from which we can consistently advance the modernisation of our systems and the development of capabilities across all forms of operations and missions.
Our objective remains unchanged: to be powerful, connected and innovative – ready to act rapidly and effectively in all situations.
Interview: Katerina Urbanova
Photo credit: Swiss Air Force
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